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An Anti-Corruption Bureau’s 
Inexorable Endeavor: A Study of 
Malawi’s Cashgate Scandal 
Peter G. Strasser* 
Abstract 
The “Cashgate” scandal has had far-reaching consequences 
for the southern African nation of Malawi and its people. Western 
donors suspended budgetary aid—circa $150 million annually—
upon learning that civil servants and senior cabinet ministers in 
former President Joyce Banda’s administration had manipulated 
the government’s financial management system to embezzle more 
than $45 million over an eighteen-month period. As a precondition 
to the resumption of aid, the donors required that the government 
not only implement financial management reforms but also fully 
prosecute the perpetrators and recover the stolen assets. The 
donors’ position solidified when audits of Malawian government 
ledgers from 2009 to 2014 could not account for $356 million. 
This essay examines whether Malawi’s Anti-Corruption 
Bureau (ACB) has the institutional capacity to achieve the 
prosecutorial benchmarks set by Western donors. Despite the 
obstacles inherent in an overstretched and underfunded criminal 
justice system, the ACB has made some progress, with fifteen 
convictions on theft and money laundering charges, and $1.4 
million in cash and property recovered. Yet, as this essay observes, 
                                                                                                     
 * The author is a partner with the New Orleans office of Chaffe McCall, 
L.L.P. He earned his J.D. from Washington & Lee School of Law and B.A. from 
the University of Virginia. The author lived in Malawi from 2006 to 2008 while 
working for the Millennium Challenge Corporation on the Malawi Threshold 
Program. This essay was inspired by the author’s recent trip to Malawi in 
collaboration with the non-profit International Senior Lawyers Project of New 
York and London to work with the Malawi Police Prosecution Service. All 
research done in preparation for this essay involved public sources. Unless 
otherwise specifically attributed, the views expressed herein are the personal 
views of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any other 
organization or individual. 
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the quest to secure convictions and recover assets in the more 
complex cases of senior officials will become quixotic unless the 
government provides the ACB with sufficient independence, 
authority, and resources. Lacking ACB operational success, 
donors seem disinclined to resume direct budgetary support to 
Malawi. And as Western countries retract, China moves in, 
extending its influence. 
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I. Introduction 
The donors’ decision to pull out budgetary support because of 
the infamous Cashgate, among key factors, has led to the collapse 
of the economy, and the scarcity of staple food, maize that has 
triggered high inflation, has pushed the cost of life to unbearable 
levels.1 
                         – Owen Khamula, Nyasa Times     – Owen Khamula, Nyasa Times 
 
                                                                                                     
 1.  Owen Khamula, Goodall Says EU Should Not ‘Cheat’ Malawi, NYASA 
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.nyasatimes.com/goodall-says-eu-should-not-
cheat-malawi-stance-on-no-budget-support-expected/ (last visited July 9, 2016) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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Cashgate, described as a “murky tale of shooting and 
corruption,” is the biggest financial scandal in the history of the 
southern African nation of Malawi.2 The scandal has had far-
reaching consequences for Malawi and its people.3 Malawi’s 
relatively stable and democratic government long made the small 
African country a “donor darling” compared to some of its 
autocratic and crisis prone neighbors.4 But the Cashgate scandal 
prompted foreign donors to withdraw budgetary aid to Malawi 
worth about $150 million annually, leaving the impoverished 
nation struggling to meet the basic needs of its people.5 With a 
                                                                                                     
 2.  Cashgate' – Malawi's Murky Tale of Shooting and Corruption, BBC 
NEWS (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25912652 (last 
visited July 9, 2016) [hereinafter BBC Cashgate Report] (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Known as Nyasaland until its independence 
in 1964, Malawi is a landlocked former British protectorate with population 
estimates approaching eighteen million. See generally Malawi, COMMONWEALTH 
YEARBOOK 2015 (Aug. 2015), http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/yb-
pdfs/malawi_country_profile.pdf (providing a factual overview of Malawi). The 
name “Malawi” is derived from the Chichewa word maravi, meaning “reflected 
light,” an apparent reference to the brilliant sunlight that glitters on the surface 
of Africa's third largest lake, Lake Malawi. Id. at 3. The country’s natural 
beauty coupled with its friendly and generous people has earned Malawi the 
appellation “The Warm Heart of Africa.” Carien Soldatos, Malawi, the Warm 
Heart of Africa, AFR. GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 3, 2015), 
http://africageographic.com/blog/malawi-the-warm-heart-of-africa (last visited 
July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3.  See Misplaced Charity, ECONOMIST (June 11, 2016), 
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21700323-development-aid-best-
spent-poor-well-governed-countries-isnt-where-it (last visited July 9, 2016) 
(“Donors . . . punish corruption and back-sliding, as in Malawi.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 4.  Id. The United Kingdom (Department for International Development 
(DFID)) has been the largest donor in Malawi, followed closely by the United 
States (Millennium Challenge Corporation), the European Union, Norway, 
Germany, Japan, the World Bank, and African Development Bank. MARKÉTA 
VON HAGEN AND NILS-SJARD SCHULZ, FRIDE PROJECT, SILENTLY LEAVING MALAWI: 
SWEDEN’S DELEGATED EXIT 4–5 (2009), 
http://fride.org/descarga/IP_Malawi_version25_ENG_nov09.pdf. Malawi’s 
Constitution enshrines an independent Parliament and Judiciary, and 
guarantees the separation of powers, rule of law, and basic freedoms such as 
religious practice, association, and information. See Michael Keating, 
Rethinking Corruption, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 317, 318 
(2007) (discussing the “phalanx of Constitutional bodies” in Malawi). Statutory 
bodies include the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Human Rights Commission, 
Ombudsman's Office, Law Commission, and Electoral Commission. Id. 
 5.  See Alfred Chauwa, Malawi Pleads with Donors for Aid: Chaponda 
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population barely surviving on subsistence farming, Malawi has 
the world’s lowest reported gross national income per capita.6 
Malawians dubbed the scandal “Cashgate” because low-level 
bureaucrats found with stockpiles of cash in their homes and 
vehicles were among the first arrests made when the scandal 
came to light in September 2013.7 In a country where the average 
government employee earns $100 per month, these cash hoards 
in amounts up to 100 million kwacha (c. $240,000) were, quite 
literally, a fortune.8 A full-scale investigation was launched a 
                                                                                                     
Says Nation in Desperate Need of Budgetary Support, NYASA TIMES (Jan. 7, 
2016), http://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-pleads-with-donors-for-aid-chaponda-
says-nation-in-desperate-need-of-budgetary-support/ (last visited July 9, 2016) 
(noting that “the decision by donors to cut aid due Cashgate has contributed to 
the country’s economic hardship”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). The United States, which provides aid via program support to 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), did not suspend aid. By supporting 
NGOs, donors can control spending and exercise flexibility when responding to 
allegations of misuse. European and other donors, however, directly supported 
the government’s budget, which allowed for increased volumes of aid but 
lessened controls. Donors commit themselves to using the recipient country’s 
financial accountability systems in return for the recipient country ensuring 
that the accountability systems work effectively. See Kim Yi Dionne, Donor 
Dependence, Donor Withdrawal: Implications of Malawi’s Cashgate Scandal, 
AIDDATA CTR. FOR DEV. POL’Y (Feb. 13, 2014), http://aiddata.org/blog/donor-
dependence-donor-withdrawal-implications-of-malawis-cashgate-scandal (last 
visited July 9, 2016) (“Aid to support government budgets shifts control over 
how money is spent from the donors to the government.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 6.  Press Release, The World Bank, WB Update Says 10 Countries Move 
Up in Income Bracket (July 1, 2015), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2015/07/01/new-world-bank-update-shows-bangladesh-kenya-myanmar-
and-tajikistan-as-middle-income-while-south-sudan-falls-back-to-low-income 
(reporting that Malawi’s GNI per capita is currently $250 and that “in 24 years 
its average per-capita income has increased by just $70”). 
 7.  Cashgate unraveled when a maid informed the police that her 
employer, a twenty-seven--year old accounts assistant at the Ministry of 
Environment, had piles of cash concealed in his home. Malawi Public Servant 
Arrested Over k120 Million Cash, NYASA TIMES (Sep. 11, 2013), 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-public-servant-arrested-over-k120-million-
cash/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). The maid had pocketed Malawi Kwacha (MK) 3 million ($7,140), 
thinking it would not be missed, but her expenditures of large sums at the 
marketplace aroused the envy of her neighbors. Id. Arrested, she led the police 
to her employer’s home, rented in a well-off enclave of Lilongwe. Id.   
 8.  The MK has a limited tradable market and steadily loses value. See 
Ckikondi Chiyembekeza, Bumpy Rise as Kwacha Slips, NATION (May 14, 2016), 
http://mwnation.com/bumpy-rise-as-kwacha-slips/ (last visited July 9, 2016) 
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week later when Malawi budget director Paul Mphwiyo was 
ambushed and shot three times outside his home. Ralph 
Kasambara, the outgoing Attorney General, was accused of 
orchestrating the assassination attempt, allegedly because 
Mphwiyo planned to expose the Cashgate conspiracy.9 
Allegations of official corruption implicated then President 
Joyce Banda, most of her senior ministers, and the President’s 
two sons, who were her closest advisors.10 A British-funded audit 
determined that civil servants and senior cabinet ministers in the 
Banda administration had manipulated the Malawian 
government’s financial management system, known as IFMIS, to 
steal more than $45 million.11 The audit further determined that 
Cashgate funds were used to support the electoral campaigns of 
Banda and her party supporters in Parliament.12  
                                                                                                     
(discussing the value of the Malawi Kwacha post-Cashgate) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Amounts stolen during the Cashgate scandal 
will be converted at the 2012–2014 average exchange rate of MK 420 to 1 USD. 
Id. Any references to kwacha expended during the 2015-2016 period will be 
converted at the average exchange rate of MK 700 to 1 USD. Id.  
 9.  BBC Cashgate Report, supra note 2. 
 10.  Allan Ntata, President Banda: Corrupt President or Upright Citizen?, 
AFRIMIND (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.afrimind.org/president-banda-corrupt-
president-or-upright-citizen/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 11.  BAKER TILLY RISK ADVISORY SERVS. LLP, REPORT ON FRAUD AND 
MISMANAGEMENT OF MALAWI GOVERNMENT FINANCES 19 (Sep. 25, 2014), 
http://banthutimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/20140925-Final-Report-
overaching-report-to-AG.pdf. The Integrated Financial Management 
Information System (IFMIS) was implemented in 2005 to support government 
departments with budgeting, accounting, and reporting. See Alan Bacarese, 
Malawi’s Cashgate Crisis – An African Corruption Metaphor or a Sign of Hope?, 
INT’L CTR. FOR ASSET RECOVERY (Sep. 12, 2015), 
https://forum.assetrecovery.org/icarforum/blog/malawi%E2%80%99s-cashgate-
crisis-%E2%80%93-african-corruption-metaphor-or-sign-hope (last visited July 
17, 2016) (discussing the role of IFMIS in the Cashgate scandal) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Crucially, IFMIS also managed payments to 
suppliers, leading to the printing of Reserve Bank of Malawi checks at the 
Accountant General’s Department. Id. By 2011, warning signs of corruption 
were missed and/or covered up. By 2013, IFMIS was issuing large numbers of 
government checks for services never delivered that were cashed by 
coconspirator businessmen at local banks. Id. The government accounts clerks 
then deleted the electronic trails. Id. 
 12.  BAKER TILLY, supra note 11, at 115 (listing prominent businessman 
Oswald Lutepo, Attorney General Ralph Kasambara, and Roy Kachale, the son 
of President Banda). Malawi has no laws regulating campaign financing. See 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, MALAWI NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM ASSESSMENT REPORT 
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The scandal brought the Malawian Directorate of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP)13 and the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB)14 to 
a critical juncture. Does the ACB, Malawi’s lead anti-corruption 
institution, have the human and institutional capacity to fully 
investigate and successfully prosecute the perpetrators of the 
scandal, and, of equal importance, does it have the ability to 
recover a healthy percentage of the stolen assets? This essay will 
discuss the ACB’s institutional challenges in the Cashgate 
                                                                                                     
117, 181 (2013) [hereinafter TI REPORT], 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/nisarticle/malawi_2013 (noting that 
Malawi’s “legal framework does not provide for any limitation on campaign 
expenditure”); see also Ephraim Nyondo, Party Finances Under Spotlight, 
NATION (Aug. 9, 2016), http://mwnation.com/party-finances-under-spotlight/ (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2016) (“[P]olitical party financing in Malawi remains an area of 
unfairness, corruption, patronage and illegitimate policy influences”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 13.  The Directorate of Public Prosecutions is headed by the Director of 
Public Prosecutions, who is appointed by the President under Section 99 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Malawi (1994). Director of Public Prosecution, 
MINISTRY OF JUST. & CONST. AFF. MALAWI, 
http://www.justice.gov.mw/thedpp.html (last visited July 20, 2016) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). The DPP is responsible for all public 
prosecutions, including general criminal cases, homicide, and corruption cases. 
It supervises the Police Prosecution Service (police officers), who nationwide try 
circa 85% of all the general criminal cases in the Magistrate courts. Id. The DPP 
has thirty prosecutors working in its principal office in the capital city, 
Lilongwe, and two regional branch offices. Most prosecutors have less than two 
years of experience trying cases; very few have more than five years. Id.  
 14.  The Anti-Corruption Bureau is an independent agency with the legal 
mandate under the Corrupt Practices Act to prevent, investigate, and, with the 
DPP Director’s consent, prosecute corruption in Malawi. See Corrupt Practices 
Act No. 17, Cap. 7:04 (2004), Laws of Rep. of Malawi [hereinafter Corrupt 
Practices Act] (establishing the ACB), http://www.acbmw.com/wp-
content/downloads/Corrupt_Practices_Act-No%2017_of_2004.pdf. The ACB is 
headed by a Director and Deputy Director, both of whom are appointed by the 
President. Id. §§ 6–7. The ACB has its headquarters in Lilongwe, in the “World 
Bank Building,” and has three regional branch offices. See Clients & Role 
Players, ANTI-CORRUPTION BUREAU, MALAWI, http://www.acbmw.com/ (last 
visited June 30, 2016) (providing information on where to contact the ACB) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The ACB has three divisions 
(Management/Support, Operations, and Prosecutions) and two sections (Public 
Relations and Internal Audit). It currently employs 130 personnel, with 
prosecutors and investigators comprising about 25% of the staff. See generally 
Homepage, ANTI-CORRUPTION BUREAU, MALAWI, http://www.acbmw.com/ (last 
visited June 30, 2016) (providing information on the ACB) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
MALAWI’S CASHGATE SCANDAL 309 
prosecutions and offer observations on implications for the future 
of Malawi. It is posited herein that the gulf between the 
expectations of foreign donors and the capacities of the ACB may 
well ensure continued foreign donor disillusionment and 
permanent withholding of critical financial aid.15  
II. ACB Framework 
[T]he cash-flow situation at ACB has been [so] bad that even 
its telephone lines were disconnected.16  
 
                   – Archibald Kasakura, BNL Times 
A. History of Corruption 
Studies in Malawi over the past decade have consistently 
found that corruption is entrenched, systemic, and getting 
worse.17 Donor-driven legislative and institutional reforms proved 
inadequate to eradicate, let alone control, corruption.18 Without 
popular demand for good governance and competence, and 
without high standards among the individuals responsible for 
                                                                                                     
 15.  See ALAN DOIG ET AL., U4 REPORTS, MEASURING ‘SUCCESS’ IN FIVE 
AFRICAN ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSIONS 4 (2005), 
http://www.u4.no/publications/measuring-success-in-five-african-anti-
corruption-commissions/ (remarking upon the lack of synchronicity and 
compatibility between the needs, capacities, and expectations of governments, 
donors, and anti-corruption agencies). 
 16.  Archibald Kasakura, Malawi’s Anti-Corruption Bureau Hit by 
Underfunding, BNLTIMES (July 12, 2014), http://timesmediamw.com/malawis-
anti-corruption-bureau-hit-by-underfunding/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 17.  TI REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–28. President Bingu wa Mutharika, 
the architect of the “zero-tolerance” policy, acknowledged he “did not know 
whether the war against corruption was being won.” Id. at 192. But see Thom 
Chiumia, Corruption ‘Not Endemic’ in Malawi – President Mutharika, NYASA 
TIMES (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.nyasatimes.com/corruption-not-endemic-in-
malawi-president-mutharika/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (countering the view 
that widespread corruption exists in Malawi) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 18.  See Keating, supra note 4, at 324 (“Efforts by donors to fight corruption 
that are not rooted in a national determination are unlikely to succeed.”).  
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accountability, the fight against corruption in Malawi was 
compromised.19  
The ascension to the presidency of Vice President Joyce 
Banda, following the unforeseen death of President Bingu wa 
Mutharika in April 2012, was widely viewed as a singular 
opportunity to eradicate Malawi’s legacy of high-level political 
corruption.20 President Banda’s public statements reaffirmed 
“political will at the highest level to fight this evil” and pledged 
her “utmost commitment to the fight against graft in Malawi.”21 
But within two years, the escalating Cashgate scandal doomed 
                                                                                                     
 19.  See id. (arguing that “fighting corruption in a place like Malawi” 
depends upon these premises). “Low salaries, the lack of an effective whistle 
blowing system, and the lack of performance incentive systems all contributed 
to the culture of corruption and its broad acceptance as a way of life.” Id. at 322. 
Bakili Muluzi, the country’s first democratically elected President, was 
reportedly close to declaring bankruptcy when he took office, yet ended his 
presidency as a multi-millionaire. See Nyondo, supra note 12 (“Muluzi is 
currently in court accused of misappropriating the K1.7 billion [$11 million] 
from known and unknown sources both locally and internationally.”).   
Similarly, Muluzi’s successor, Bingu wa Mutharika, had reportedly amassed 
MK 61 billion ($85 million) by the time he died in office. See Thom Chiumia, All 
the Fear, None of the Hope in Corruption Infested Malawi, NYASA TIMES (June 
23, 2016), http://www.nyasatimes.com/fear-none-hope-corruption-infested-
malawi/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (discussing the allegations against Bingu wa 
Mutharika) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 20.  Banda was proclaimed by the West as “a beacon of hope” for her 
country and the continent inasmuch as she was Malawi’s first female president 
and had ascended to the Presidency in a peaceful and constitutional succession. 
Elliot Gerson, A New Leader for Africa, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 19, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elliot-gerson/a-new-leader-for-
africa_b_2511815.html (last updated June 19, 2013) (last visited July 9, 2016) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Upon assuming office, 
Banda introduced government austerity measures and initiated economic and 
political reforms. See id. (“Shortly after assuming office—in a country where 40 
percent of the people live on less than $1 a day and the majority can’t afford 
even a bicycle—Banda declared she would sell the presidential jet and a fleet of 
60 Mercedes limousines.”). Forbes magazine declared her the most powerful 
woman in Africa. Joyce Banda, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/profile/joyce-
banda/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Time magazine listed her among the 100 most influential people on the 
planet. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, The 2013 TIME 100: Joyce Banda, TIME (Apr. 18, 
2013), http://www.time100.time.com/2013/04/18/time-100/slide/joyce-banda/ (last 
visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 21.  President Banda to Preside over Malawi Anti-Corruption Day in 
Mangochi, NYASA TIMES (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.nyasatimes.com/president-
banda-to-preside-over-malawi-anti-corruption-day-in-mangochi/ (last visited 
July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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those expectations as well as her reelection prospects. In May 
2014, her long-time adversary, Peter Mutharika, the brother of 
deceased President Mutharika, won the presidential election.22 
Three months later, Banda went into self-imposed exile outside 
Malawi as rumors circulated of her impending Cashgate arrest.23 
Malawian commentators viewed foreign donors as complicit 
in the scandal for turning a “blind eye” to apparent signs of high-
level corruption.24 But taken aback by the brazen nature of the 
thefts, a united international donor community informed the 
Malawian government that it would suspend all direct budgetary 
support until the government (1) implemented financial 
management reforms to prevent future systematic thefts25 and (2) 
fully prosecuted the Cashgate perpetrators and recovered the 
stolen assets.26 This position further solidified after European 
                                                                                                     
 22.  New Malawi President Gets Immunity from Treason Charge, May Seek 
Revenge, TAIPEI TIMES (June 1, 2014), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2014/06/01/2003591768 (last 
visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 23.  Lameck Masina, Malawi – Why Won’t Joyce Banda Come Home?, AFR. 
ARGUMENTS (Dec. 30, 2015), http://africanarguments.org/2015/12/30/malawi-
why-wont-joyce-banda-come-home-2/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 24.  See ALLAN NTATA, LICENSE TO LOOT: A REPORT ON THE CASHGATE 
CORRUPTION SCANDAL 47 (2013), 
https://rebeccachimjeka.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/licence-to-loot-malawi-
cashgate-scandal-report.pdf (arguing donor complacency in Banda’s refusal to 
disclose her assets). 
 25.  Mike Kanguele, Malawi: Donors Shun Malawi for Zimbabwe, 
MALAWI24 (Feb. 16, 2015), http://allafrica.com/stories/201502170083.html (last 
visited July 9, 2016) (“[D]onors are not shaken. Their message, as articulated by 
UK and World Bank recently, is very clear: Put in place financial management 
reforms to stop a sequel to the cashgate scandal from happening.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 26.  See Thom Chiumia, Britain Won’t Resume Malawi Aid: Resolve 
Cashgate from 2005–House of Lords, NYASA TIMES (Oct. 24, 2014), 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/britain-wont-resume-malawi-aid-resolve-cashgate-
from-2005-house-of-lords/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (“Britain will not be able to 
resume aid support until the government clamped ‘firmly down on corruption’ 
and the cashgate scandal . . . is independently and properly resolved.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Green Muheya, Malawi to Trace 
Cashgate Tainted Assets, Says Mutharika as German Calls for Recovery, NYASA 
TIMES (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-to-trace-cashgate-
tainted-assets-says-mutharika-as-german-calls-for-recovery/ (last visited July 9, 
2016) (“We are much interested in the recovery of money and the arrest of the 
culprits . . . . [V]ery important to all of us is the recovery of the stolen assets.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); US Anticipate Convictions of 
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funded audits of government ledgers from 2009 to 2014 could not 
account for MK 236 billion ($356 million).27  
Recent reports indicate that the Malawian government is 
slowly “moving in the right direction” to foster budget control and 
transparency.28 The second prong of the donor demand has 
proven to be equally challenging; only fifteen mid-level 
defendants have been convicted and MK 1 billion ($1.4 million) 
recovered.29  
B. Criminal Justice System 
The Malawian courts’ structure was inherited from the 
British colonial system.30 Cases are heard before a single judge, 
                                                                                                     
Gurus in Malawi’s Cashgate, NYASA TIMES (Mar. 6, 2015), 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/us-anticipate-convictions-of-gurus-in-malawis-
cashgate/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2016) (“[T]here should be convictions of senior 
officials.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 27.   The unreconciled amount was initially thought to be MK 577 billion 
($850 million), but was recently corrected to MK 236 billion. Steven Nhlane and 
Rebecca Chimjeka, Inside K577bn Forensic Audit, NATION (July 9, 2016), 
http://mwnation.com/inside-k577bn-forensic-audit/ (last visited July 18, 2016) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 28.  Orama Chinamulungu, IMF Extends Programme, Analysts Urge 
Caution, NATION (June 22, 2016),  http://mwnation.com/imf-extends-programme-
analysts-urge-caution/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); see also Owen Khamula, Malawi Govt Buys K2bn IFMIS 
Software to Prevent Another Cashgate, NYASA TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016), 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-govt-buys-k2bn-ifmis-software-to-prevent-
another-cashgate/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (reporting that, per a $2.6 million 
grant from the World Bank and United States, IFMIS received requisite 
upgrades) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 29.  See Owen Khamula, Financial Woes Affect Malawi Graft Busting 
Body’s Cashgate Probe, NYASA TIMES (Apr. 23, 2016), 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/financial-woes-affect-malawi-graft-busting-bodys-
cashgate-probe/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (confirming fifteen convictions) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Six luxury buses purchased for the 
Banda campaign represent $1 million of this sum; cash seized at the inception of 
the investigation and restitution connected with plea bargains comprise the 
other $400,000. Owen Khamula, K1bn Cashgate Criminal Proceeds: Malawi Yet 
to Decide How to Dispose It, NYASA TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/k1bn-cashgate-criminal-proceeds-malawi-yet-to-
decide-how-to-dispose-it/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 30.  Const. of Rep. of Malawi (1994), Cap. IX, established a hierarchical 
system of courts: a Supreme Court of Appeal, High Courts, and Magistrates’ 
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without a jury, and consist of piecemeal hearings spanning 
months or even years.31 As in many developing countries, the 
criminal justice system is handicapped by serious weaknesses, 
including a shortage of judges, inexperienced prosecutors, 
insufficient funding for trials, an overwhelming backlog of cases, 
dysfunctional courthouses, and overcrowded prisons.32 NGO 
studies indicate there is a widespread lack of knowledge of the 
law, including the Constitution and relevant legislation, amongst 
both lawyers and magistrates.33 The presentation of insufficient 
evidence in court by inexperienced prosecutors has required 
judges to intervene and play an inquisitorial role just to ascertain 
the facts of the case.34 
                                                                                                     
Courts (divided into four categories/grades). 
 31.  Per Section 294(2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code, jury 
trials have been suspended at various times since 1996 and were suspended 
indefinitely in 2008 due to lack of funds and backlog of cases. Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Code, Cap. 8:01, Laws of Rep. of Malawi [hereinafter 
Criminal Procedure Code], 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/90376/104138/F-
2103641943/MWI90376.pdf. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, 
H.R. AND LAB., MALAWI HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 7–8 (2015), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/252913.pdf. In high-profile cases, 
a verdict by a sole judge is invariably open to question, not just for error but also 
for motive. See, e.g., Thom Chiumia, Kasambara Files Appeal to Supreme Court 
of Malawi: Judge Mtambo Made Multiple ‘Errors in Law’, Ignored Evidence, 
NYASA TIMES (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.nyasatimes.com/kasambara-files-
appeal-supreme-court-malawi-judge-mtambo-made-multiple-errors-law-ignored-
evidence/ (“The appeal said Mtambo’s bias was ‘right from the start of the case 
all the way up to the time when he capriciously revoked [Kasambara‘s] bail.’ ”). 
 32.  IRISH RULE OF LAW INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT: MALAWI ACCESS TO JUSTICE 5 
(Oct. 2013) [hereinafter IRISH RULE OF LAW], http://irishruleoflaw.ie/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/Malawi-Annual-Report_Oct-2013.pdf; see also INT’L BAR 
ASS’N’S HUM. RIGHTS INST., RULE OF LAW IN MALAWI: THE ROAD TO RECOVERY 23, 
41 (Sep. 2012) [hereinafter RULE OF LAW IN MALAWI], 
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=C9872074-1DF6-
47E7-B2AA-728144009382. 
 33.  See IRISH RULE OF LAW, supra note 32, at 5 (discussing the flaws of 
Malawi’s criminal justice system); RULE OF LAW IN MALAWI, supra note 32, at 41 
(same). 
 34.  Discussion with Professor of Practical Legal Studies, Chancellor 
College, Zomba, Malawi (Jan. 2016) (“Malawi is supposed to be a British system, 
but we end up being French”). It is difficult for the DPP to retain experienced 
prosecutors. Poorly paid, they labor under substandard working conditions in 
dilapidated offices and routinely lack fundamental necessities such as reliable 
electricity, desktop computers, cell phones, toner for printers, cars and/or fuel to 
drive to court, and money to find and get witnesses to court. Id.; see also TI 
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Despite 2010 amendments to the Malawi Criminal Procedure 
Code, which specified thirty-to-ninety day custody time limits for 
pre-trial detainees, and mandated for less serious offenses the 
commencement of trial within a year of arrest and completion of 
trial within twelve months thereafter,35 those provisions are 
routinely ignored. Defendants often spend years in pre-trial 
confinement because unavoidable delays are regarded as “a 
reason that trumps the right to release.”36 As defendants 
languish in jail, prosecutors are transferred, court files are lost, 
and cases are forgotten.37  
High-profile political cases drain the courts’ capacity. 
Prosecution of the Cashgate scandal alone required reallocation 
of judges’ time and new court spaces, further straining a criminal 
justice system already at its breaking point.38 
                                                                                                     
REPORT, supra note 12, at 96.  
 35.  Criminal Procedure Code, §§ 161A, 302A. 
 36.  CLIFFORD MSISKA ET AL., OPEN SOCIETY INITIATIVE FOR SOUTHERN 
AFRICA, PRE-TRIAL DETENTION CUSTODY TIME LIMITS: ENSURING COMPLIANCE IN 
MALAWI 6–7, 19 (2013),  
http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/malawi_cus
tody_time_limit_report__january_2013.pdf. 
 37.  See RULE OF LAW IN MALAWI, supra note 32, at 47 (“[P]re-trial detention 
could last up to nine years.”). In what is anticipated to alleviate the problem of 
lost files, the judiciary, with a $1.4 million grant from the European Union, 
recently converted to an electronic case management system. See Precious 
Kumbani, E-Justice System on Track, NATION (June 24, 2016), 
http://mwnation.com/e-justice-system-on-track/ (last visited July 9, 2016) 
(discussing Malawi’s new case management system) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 38.  See RACHEL ELLET, FREEDOM HOUSE, POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN MALAWI 28–29 (2014), 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Malawi%20Judicial%2
0Independence%20Report%20Final.pdf (“The judiciary is so overstretched that 
budget issues are not simply a matter of increasing the efficiency of the courts; 
they are a matter of survival for the courts.”); Charlotte Mackenzie, Malawi's 
Criminal Justice System Is in Need of Urgent Reform, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-
network/2014/feb/05/malawi-criminal-justice-system-reform (last visited July 9, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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C. Development Cycles 
The Corrupt Practices Act of 1995 established the Anti-
Corruption Bureau (ACB) and vested it with broad powers to 
investigate and prosecute corruption, and to take necessary 
measures to prevent corruption in both the public and private 
sectors. The ACB is statutorily obliged under the Act to 
investigate “any” complaint of corruption it receives, but it can 
only initiate a prosecution subject to the “consent” of the Director 
of Public Prosecution.39 The Corrupt Practices Act was amended 
in 2004 to grant the ACB increased powers by widening the 
definition of corruption to include, inter alia, offenses for abuse of 
office and possession of unexplained wealth.40 Yet the legislative 
amendments did not ensure greater independence for the ACB. 
The Director and Deputy Director of the ACB, as well as the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, all hold their positions at the 
President’s discretion.41 
Although the ACB made strides over the past decade in 
prosecuting corruption, its efforts were mostly limited to lower-
level government officials.42 Encouragingly, President Peter 
Mutharika vowed “zero tolerance” and declared he would “shield 
none.”43 His newly appointed DPP and ACB Directors thereby 
proceeded with the indictments of more than seventy 
                                                                                                     
 39.  Corrupt Practices Act, §§ 10, 42.  
 40.  Id. §§ 25B, 32. 
 41.  Mabvuto Hara, The Independence of Prosecuting Authorities: The 
Malawi Experience, in FOSTERING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA 61, 84 (C. 
Fombad & C. Murray, eds., 2010). The Parliament of Malawi consistently rejects 
amendments to the Corrupt Practices Act that would change the ACB’s status 
from a statutory body to a constitutional authority—thereby limiting 
presidential appointment and dismissal powers—as attempts to usurp executive 
power. See José Safarao, Mutharika Must Be Impeached for Meddling with the 
Muluzi Case, MALAWI24 (May 15, 2016), http://malawi24.com/2016/05/15/no-
holds-barred-mutharika-must-impeached-meddling-muluzi-case/ (last visited 
July 9, 2016) (“[T]he [ruling party] voted unanimously in parliament to defeat a 
bill that aimed at making the ACB independent.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 42.  FARZANA NAWAZ, U4 ANTI-CORRUPTION RESOURCE CENTER, OVERVIEW OF 
CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION IN MALAWI 7 (2012), http://issuu.com/cmi-
norway/docs/120723082546-27b9f0c65ce6493cacbbceb4399d4e34/1?e=0. 
 43.  Safarao, supra note 41. 
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individuals—including senior civil servants, politicians, and 
business owners—in connection with Cashgate.44 
A 2005 study on five African Anti-Corruption Commissions, 
including the Malawi Anti-Corruption Bureau, noted that the 
development cycles of the continent’s anti-corruption agencies 
were invariably sporadic, erratic, and vulnerable to disruption by 
the volatility of government support and fluctuating donor 
enthusiasm and fatigue.45 Today, the Malawi ACB mirrors that 
pattern, with its vulnerabilities exacerbated by two major 
constraints. First, there is no security in the tenure of the ACB 
Director’s office; few Directors have fully served their terms.46 
                                                                                                     
 44.  Zawadi Chilunga, APM Appoints New Malawi Anti-Corruption Czar, 
NYASA TIMES (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.nyasatimes.com/apm-appoints-new-
malawi-anti-corruption-czar-lucas-kondowe-a-financial-expert/ (last visited July 
9, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Collins Mtika, 
Cashgate: Malawi's Bigwigs Feel the Heat, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2014), 
http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-24-malawis-bigwigs-feel-the-heat (last visited 
July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 45.  See DOIG ET AL., supra note 15, at 4–5. (discussing the differing 
“lifecycles” of foreign donors and anti-corruption agencies).  
The lifecycle of governments involves the gradual displacement of 
anti-corruption as a high priority and indeed political commitment is 
frequently confined to exposing the crimes of previous regimes. 
Governments experience periods of instability and, where ACCs 
investigate corruption at the highest political levels, the response is 
not often supportive. Rather, ACC Directors are dismissed, authority 
to prosecute is withheld in sensitive cases and under-resourcing of 
the ACC becomes the norm, further undermining its capacity and 
reputation.  
Id. at 4. “All African ACCs subsist in conditions far less propitious and with 
much scarcer resources and capabilities than the ACC prototype. In effect, 
African ACCs have been consigned to a form of existence that not only 
constrains, but almost guarantees their inability to attain achievable levels of 
success.” Id. at 6. 
 46.  Hara, supra note 41, at 83. For example, when, in July 2006, the 
Director of the Anti-Corruption Bureau arrested former President Muluzi on 
corruption charges, President Bingu wa Mutharika immediately suspended the 
ACB Director, without giving reasons as required by the Corrupt Practices Act. 
Id.; see infra note 55 (discussing the circumstances of the ACB Director’s 
removal).  The Commissioner of Police Prosecutors was then appointed Acting 
ACB Director; a year later, he was removed when it was discovered that he was 
drawing two salaries, one from each institution. Anti-Graft Chief Suspended, 
NEWS24 (Sep. 11, 2007), http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Anti-graft-chief-
suspended-20070910 (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). Later, his successor resigned for drawing allowances on 
official trips he never took. Malawi Anti-Corruption Chief Nampota Arrested, 
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Second, very limited resources are provided by the government.47 
In the past, donors largely contributed to the ACB’s budget.48 But 
due to Cashgate, foreign support is now limited to British 
technical advisors and training.49 The financial deficit has not 
been offset by increased funding from the Malawian Treasury.50 
The ACB Director publically declared he required double the 
provided budget to run investigations in the Cashgate scandal.51  
D. Institutional Limitations  
The lack of secured tenure of senior management and the 
lack of budgetary independence have contributed to institutional 
bottlenecks that limit ACB operations.52 Due to minimal funding 
and support, staffers have gone on strike to protest pay and 
conditions.53 Investigators and prosecutors resign for higher-
paying jobs elsewhere.54 To add to the problem, there have been 
notable instances of political interference in sensitive cases.55 
                                                                                                     
Given Bail, NYASA TIMES (June 28, 2012), http://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-
anti-corruption-chief-nampota-arrested-given-bail/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 47.  TI REPORT, supra note 12, at 159–60.  
 48.  Id. at 161.  
 49.  DEP’T. FOR INT’L DEV., OPERATIONAL PLAN 2011-2016 DFID MALAWI 18 
(Dec. 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/389289/Malawi.pdf.  
 50.  Khamula, Financial Woes, supra note 29. 
 51.  Chiumia, supra note 17. 
 52.  NAWAZ, supra note 42, at 6.  
 53.  Wanga Gwede, Malawi Anti-Corruption Bureau Staff Strike Over Pay, 
NYASA TIMES (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-anti-corruption-
bureau-staff-strike-over-pay/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 54.  TI REPORT, supra note 12, at 160; Mass Resignation at Malawi Graft-
busting Body ACB as Njauju Murder still Haunts, NYASA TIMES (June 11, 2016), 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/mass-resignation-malawi-graft-busting-body-acb-
njauju-murder-still-haunts/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 55.  TI REPORT, supra note 12, at 166; Hara, supra note 41, at 83. For 
example, in 2006, President Bingu wa Mutharika fired the ACB and DPP 
Directors for arresting former President Bakili Muluzi on corruption charges; 
President Mutharika needed cross-party support in Parliament to ensure 
passage of his budget, a requirement for IMF debt forgiveness. Keating, supra 
note 5, at 321; Hara, supra note 41, at 83–84. Recently, the reinstituted 
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Consequently, public surveys reflect a growing perception that 
the ACB is unable to act as an autonomous body and that, 
instead, it makes decisions that favor particular people or 
political parties.56 
As in other countries with British common law traditions, 
such as Kenya or Pakistan, prosecutors in Malawi play no role in 
the investigations, although in theory they could exercise their 
advisory authority to guide an investigation.57 Due to ingrained 
historical practice, investigators believe that the entire 
investigative domain is exclusively within their professional, 
skilled responsibility.58 Prosecutors, furthermore, have 
institutional concerns over involvement in an investigation for 
fear of becoming witnesses. As a result, prosecutors will not 
receive a file from investigators until the investigation is 
complete.59  
Consequently, ACB prosecutors were overwhelmed upon 
receiving Cashgate case files detailing complicated financial 
schemes. The prosecutors were faced with targets that had the 
money and power to hire highly experienced defense lawyers.60 
                                                                                                     
corruption case against Muluzi was thrown into disarray when the ACB Deputy 
Director withdrew, stating “personal reasons,” but, some allege, most likely due 
to political bargaining between the two parties. Safarao, supra note 41.  
 56.  TI REPORT, supra note 12, at 166; MALAWI ECONOMIC JUSTICE NETWORK, 
MALAWI COMPLIANCE REPORT 2014 19 (2014) [hereinafter MEJN REPORT], 
http://www.mejnmw.org/publications/Reports/Malawi-Compliance-Report-
2014.pdf.  
 57.  See JOHN MARU ET AL., UNITED NATIONS ASIA AND FAR EAST INSTITUTE 
PREVENTION OF CRIME INTERNATIONAL SENIOR SEMINAR, COOPERATION BETWEEN 
THE POLICE AND PROSECUTORS 195 (2002), 
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No60/No60_21RC_Group2.pdf (noting 
that “prosecutors play no role in investigation as such, but do exercise their 
advisory or supervisory authority to guide the police investigation in such ways 
as advising or instructing the police to carry out their investigation to certain 
direction”). 
 58.  Id. at 196. 
 59.  Id. at 195. In comparison, United States federal investigators and 
prosecutors consider early consultation useful in improving good working 
relationships and the likelihood of better results in investigations. Id. at 199. 
 60.  See, e.g., Golden Matonga, Savala’s Bail After Conviction Raises Spectre 
of Richman’s Justice, GOLDEN MATONGA TODAY (July 18, 2015), 
https://goldenmatonga.wordpress.com/2015/07/18/savalas-bail-after-conviction-
raises-spectre-of-richmans-justice/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (“It is now widely 
accepted that the rich and the poor gets [sic] a different set of justice.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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The continuous stays and adjournments filed by defense counsel, 
and the lack of funds and resources to further investigate and try 
cases, began to contribute to a sense of dismay, pessimism, and 
insecurity.61  
But the single greatest impediment hobbling the ACB soon 
became fear. Homes of those working on Cashgate investigations 
were burglarized.62 The ACB Deputy Director and several 
investigators received death threats.63 An ACB prosecution of 
fourteen defendants charged with the theft of MK 200 million 
($476,000) from the Ministry of Disability Affairs was 
discontinued due to death threats.64 In a curious incident, an 
unidentified man deposited MK 2 million ($2,800) into the ACB 
Director’s private bank account in an attempt to make it appear 
that the Director was accepting cash bribes.65 Even the High 
Court judges presiding over the Cashgate cases openly 
acknowledged they were living in constant fear.66 
The determinative message to the ACB that it should tread 
lightly in the Cashgate prosecutions was forcefully delivered with 
the targeted killing of the ACB Director of Corporate Services, 
Issa Njauju. His burnt vehicle was found several miles away from 
                                                                                                     
 61.  Suzgo Khunga, 2014 Review: The Year Cashgate Went on Trial, NATION 
(Dec. 30, 2014), http://mwnation.com/2014-review-year-cashgate-went-trial/ (last 
visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 62.  See, e.g., Golden Matonga, Njauju: Terror of a Perfect Murder, AFRIEM 
(Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.afriem.org/2015/11/njauju-terror-of-a-perfect-
murder/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (reporting that burglars stole computers and 
documents from the house of a German official involved in the Cashgate forensic 
audits) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 63.  Wanga Gwede, ACB Officials Receive Death Threats over Malawi 
Cashgate Crackdown, NYASA TIMES (Nov. 11, 2014), 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/acb-officials-receive-death-threats-over-malawi-
cashgate-crackdown/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 64.  Mphatso Nkhoma, Death Threats in Malawi 2011 Cashgate Trial, 
NYASA TIMES (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.nyasatimes.com/death-threats-in-
malawi-2011-cashgate-trial-mphwiyo-corruption-rap-begins-march-16/ (last 
visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 65.  Edwin Nyirongo, ACB Boss Disowns Mysterious K2m Deposit, NATION 
(Apr. 2, 2015), http://mwnation.com/acb-boss-disowns-mysterious-k2m-deposit/ 
(last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 66.  Cashgate Judges Threatened, MALAWI24 (Sep. 2, 2015), 
http://www.africanewshub.com/news/3793830-cashgate-judges-threatened (last 
visited July 17, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
320 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 303 (2016) 
the forested area where his decomposed, bullet-riddled body was 
later discovered. Police believe that the murder was the result of 
mistaken identity. The real target might well have been the ACB 
Deputy Director, who headed the Cashgate prosecutions, 
previously received death threats, physically resembled Njauju, 
and drove a similar vehicle. The perpetrator(s) remain 
unidentified.67  
III. Legal Aspects of Cashgate Prosecutions 
“The convict [Oswald Lutepo] will serve a total of 11 years in 
prison,” Judge Redson Kapindu said in his ruling, adding that 
the scandal had had a “bad impact on Malawi society and those 
responsible should be held to account.” 
Lutepo . . . said he would appeal. “The judge has been 
inconsiderate, because I pleaded guilty on my own undertaking. 
That should have been considered.”68 
 
                                                      – News24  
A. Initial Prosecutions  
As noted, fifteen defendants associated with the Banda 
administration have been found guilty at trial or pleaded guilty to 
theft and money laundering charges. Some critics view the 
Cashgate prosecutions as politically motivated against President 
Banda.69 But few in Malawi would disagree that well-founded 
                                                                                                     
 67.  Matonga, supra note 62. 
 68.  Malawi 'Cashgate' Scandal Official Jailed for 11 Years, NEWS24 (Sep. 
4, 2015), http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Malawi-Cashgate-scandal-official-
jailed-for-11-years-20150904-4 (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 69. See Lucky Mkandawire, Lawyers Query ACB Impartiality, NATION 
(June 13, 2016), http://mwnation.com/lawyers-query-acb-impartiality/ (last 
visited July 9, 2016) (criticizing the ACB for failing to execute a Cashgate arrest 
warrant on a Mutharika party official) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Safarao, supra note 41 (criticizing the ACB for prosecuting Banda 
officials yet withdrawing from President Muluzi’s prosecution); Owen Khamula, 
Kamlepo Hits at ACB for Inaction in Malawi Grand Corruption, NYASA TIMES 
(July 19, 2016), http://allafrica.com/stories/201607190231.html (last visited Aug. 
5, 2016) (criticizing the ACB for failing to investigate current Cabinet ministers 
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corruption prosecutions are a reasonable exercise in the rule of 
law.70  
The cases brought to date have been the simpler cases, 
consisting of businessmen who collected the cash and mid-level 
officials who authorized the payments.71 The true test for the 
ACB’s effectiveness will come with the trials charging the 
campaign finance schemes of former Budget Director Paul 
Mphwiyo, former Attorney General Ralph Kasambara, and other 
senior-level defendants.72 Those trials were in abeyance for the 
past two years pending resolution of the ongoing trial of the 
former Attorney General for conspiring to assassinate the former 
Budget Director.73 That trial, which concluded with a guilty 
verdict just prior to the publication of this essay, had riveted 
public attention and essentially pushed aside the theft and 
money laundering cases.74  
                                                                                                     
implicated in the European funded audits) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 70.  See FIDELIS KANYONGOLO, AFRIMAP & OPEN SOCIETY INITIATIVE FOR 
SOUTHERN AFRICA, MALAWI: JUSTICE SECTOR AND THE RULE OF LAW 91 (2006), 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/malawi_20060912.pdf 
(noting that such prosecutions are “justified as the legitimate performance of the 
government’s obligation to uphold the principles of accountability and 
transparency”).                    
 71.  See Golden Matonga, Fight Graft – Donors, NATION (May 21, 2016), 
http://mwnation.com/fight-graft-donors/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (“We have not 
benefited anything from the Anti-Corruption Bureau.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 72.  Mphatso Nkhoma, Manondo Reveals Mphwiyo Was Kingpin of Malawi 
Cashgate, Funded Political Campaigns in PP, MCP, NYASA TIMES (Jan. 28, 
2016), http://www.nyasatimes.com/manondo-reveals-mphwiyo-was-kingpin-of-
malawi-cashgate-funded-political-campaigns-in-pp-mcp-there-was-no-deal-with-
jzu-or-chakwera/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 73.  Mphatso Nkhoma, Malawi Court Fails to Accommodate Mphwiyo, 18 
Others Cashgate Case, NYASA TIMES (Apr. 14, 2016), 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-court-fails-to-accommodate-mphwiyo-18-
others-cashgate-case-no-plea-after-preliminary-objections/ (last visited July 9, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 74.  See Malawi Lessons Galore: Guns, Smoke and Screens as State Wins 
Round One, NYASA TIMES (July 22, 2016), http://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-
lessons-galore-guns-smoke-screens-state-wins-round-one/ (“[T]he former 
Minister of Justice cum Attorney General, and arguably Malawi’s most brilliant 
lawyer, is now incarcerated.”); Thula Chisamba, Expert Worried About Cashgate 
Trials, MALAWI STAR (Feb. 20, 2016), 
http://www.malawistar.com/2016/02/20/expert-worried-with-cashgate-trials (last 
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Complicating matters, Kasambara represented himself in the 
attempted murder trial while serving as defense counsel for other 
Cashgate defendants.75 The DPP moved to have him disqualified 
from representing other defendants, to no avail.76 Ironically, the 
judge in Kasambara’s theft and money laundering case had to 
recuse himself because he is married to the DPP Director – who 
personally prosecuted the attempted murder trial.77 At one point, 
the judge in the attempted murder trial found Kasambara in 
contempt of court for accessing his (the judge’s) private 
information and obstructing the progress of the case. He revoked 
Kasambara’s bail and ordered Kasambara to spend five months 
in Lilongwe’s notorious Maula prison.78 
                                                                                                     
visited August 3, 2016) (“[S]ince the inception of the scandal, there has been 
little progress in judicial proceedings to serve justice to Malawians who are still 
appalled by Cashgate and the international community which still waits for a 
valid solution to the evil that has left this ‘once’ vibrant nation in tatters.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 75.  Kasambara’s Road to Ruin, NYASA TIMES (Aug. 5, 2016), 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/kasambaras-road-ruin-malawi-ex-justice-minister/ 
(last visited Aug. 6, 2016) (“Conducting his own defence, Kasambara schemed 
and plotted and blustered.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 76.  State Wants Kasambara Disqualified, NATION (June 4, 2015), 
http://mwnation.com/state-wants-kasambara-disqualified/ (last visited July 9, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 77.  Wanga Gwede, Judge Kachale Steps Down from Kasambara Money 
Laundering Case, NYASA TIMES (Aug. 18, 2015), 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/judge-kachale-steps-down-from-kasambara-money-
laundering-case/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 78.  Bail Restored for Kasambara, Kumwembe, NYASA TIMES (Feb. 10, 2016), 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/bail-restored-for-kasambara-kumwembe-judge-
mtambo-issue-gag-order/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). The judge, however, spared Kasambara from spending 
nights in Maula prison because the sleeping conditions were considered too 
horrific. See, e.g., Michael Wines, The Forgotten of Africa, Wasting Away in Jails 
Without Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/06/world/africa/the-forgotten-of-africa-wasting-
away-in-jails-without-trial.html?_r=0 (last visited July 9, 2016) (“The [Maula] 
cells contain 160 men, packed on the concrete floor, unable even to move. The 
water is dirty; the toilets foul. Disease is rife . . . Dickens in the tropics, places of 
cruel, but hardly unusual punishment.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). As of this writing, Kasambara, recently convicted of conspiracy to 
commit murder, is on remand in Maula (including nights) pending sentencing. 
See Malawi Lessons Galore, supra note 74 (“[Kasambara] knows prison 
conditions. He knows that a stay in prison is, literally, a journey to and through 
hell.”). Conspiracy to commit murder carries a maximum term of fourteen years 
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B. Plea Bargaining 
There is a worldwide trend favoring increased use of plea 
bargaining, with a resultant substantial reduction of the burden 
on courts and prisons.79 The ACB has not, except under limited 
circumstances, availed itself of that trend. The problem has been 
that plea bargaining in Malawi takes place in a legal vacuum. 
Although the Criminal Procedure Code does not specifically 
prohibit plea bargaining, there is no legal framework to regulate 
the practice.80 Until 2010, the Code was completely silent on the 
matter. In an effort to address this gap, the 2010 amendments 
provided that “[t]he Chief Justice [of the Supreme Court] may 
make rules that shall permit . . . plea bargaining.”81 The Chief 
Justice, however, stated that prior to the issuance of such rules 
there should be civic education for the public and training for the 
judiciary on plea bargaining.82  
Several Cashgate suspects initially indicated they wished to 
enter into pre-trial arrangements whereby they would become 
government witnesses and return stolen money. Although the 
ACB requested Supreme Court guidance on the proposed plea 
bargains, the Chief Justice declined, reaffirming the need for 
                                                                                                     
imprisonment. Penal Code, Cap. 7:01, Laws of Rep. of Malawi § 227, 
http://www.iglhrc.org/sites/default/files/Malawi%20Penal%20Code%207-01.pdf. 
 79.  STEPHEN THAMAN, WORLD PLEA BARGAINING: CONSENSUAL 
PROCEDURES AND THE AVOIDANCE OF THE FULL CRIMINAL TRIAL, at xvii (2010) 
The ‘full-blown’ trial with ‘all the guarantees’ is no longer affordable. 
With the rise in crime and the more cost- and labor-intensive 
procedures required by modern notions of due process, legislatures 
and courts around the world are gradually giving priority to the 
principle of procedural economy and introducing forms of consensual 
and abbreviated criminal procedure to deal with overloaded dockets. 
 80.  The absence of explicit regulatory frameworks has not prevented plea 
bargaining worldwide. Id. at 377–380; see also Danwood Chirwa & Esther 
Gumboh, Malawi: Plea Bargaining in Malawi Cashgate Context – It Takes a 
Thief to Catch a Thief, NYASA TIMES (Sep. 7, 2015), 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/plea-bargaining-in-malawi-cashgate-context-it-
takes-a-thief-to-catch-a-thief/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (“[T]he State has always 
been able to use plea bargaining in the prosecution process as part of 
prosecutorial discretion.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 81.  Criminal Procedure Code, § 252A. 
 82.  See Matonga, supra note 60 (“People can easily think the judiciary is 
letting the guilty walk free. And that can erode confidence.”).  
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public and judicial education.83 ACB prosecutors nevertheless 
decided to proceed, envisaging charging a lesser offense and/or 
using the guilty plea as mitigation in sentencing.84 
Malawians, embittered by the theft of public funds that 
resulted in suspension of $150 million yearly in essential foreign 
aid, were in no mood for anything but harsh sentences.85 The 
public image of the ACB—and, to a large extent, its ability to 
enforce anti-corruption laws effectively depended on the degree to 
which the public understood and supported its goals and policies. 
Arguably, the ACB’s Public Relations Section should have 
educated the press and public on the benefits of plea bargaining 
in a justice system beset with severe docket overload.86 In failing 
to do so, the ACB left unrebutted the public impression that plea 
bargaining was a triumph of administrative and organizational 
interests over justice whereby the well-connected protected each 
other.87  
The ACB entered into its first plea bargain with the former 
Principal Secretary of the Tourism Ministry, Treza Senzani.88 She 
became the first top official involved in Cashgate to be convicted 
and sentenced. Senzani confessed to stealing MK 63 million 
($150,000), pleaded guilty to theft and money laundering, and 
                                                                                                     
 83.  No Plea Bargains for Cashgate Suspects – Malawi Judiciary, NYASA 
TIMES (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.nyasatimes.com/no-plea-bargains-for-
cashgate-suspects-malawi-judiciary/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 84.  Chirwa, supra note 80.  
 85.  See, e.g., NTATA, supra note 24, at 12  
 [P]eople are dying every day from treatable diseases and illnesses 
due to acute shortages of drugs in the country's public hospitals, and 
the Government’s central medical stores frequently have to announce 
that there are no medicine reserves and the sick are told to go and 
buy medicines at private pharmacies, while billions of taxpayer 
[kwacha] are being found in bank accounts of senior government 
ministers. 
 86.  Matonga, supra note 60; see ANTI-CORRUPTION BUREAU MALAWI, A 
COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY 20 (2007), 
http://www.acauthorities.org/sites/aca/files/countrydoc/Fighting%20Corruption%
20through%20Communications-Communication-Strategy.pdf (“ACB’s 
communications initiatives can return their investments many-fold”). 
 87.  Steven Kayuni, Running to Standstill: Reflections on the Cashgate 
Scandal Heist in Malawi, 19 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL (forthcoming 
2016) (preprint copy at 2). 
 88.  Id. at 1. 
MALAWI’S CASHGATE SCANDAL 325 
agreed to make restitution by turning over her bank account and 
one of her homes. Even though her bank account was practically 
empty and her released house was worth $87,000 at current 
exchange rates, she was sentenced to only three years 
imprisonment.89  
Predictably, a harsh public backlash ensued. The ACB 
learned too late that managing communications before a crisis 
event is much easier than rebuilding a damaged reputation 
afterwards.90 The sentence was widely condemned as a setback in 
the fight against the Cashgate corruption by establishing a 
wrong, lenient precedent.91 It was derided as a “total mockery” of 
the justice system, especially when compared to stiff sentences 
handed out for relatively minor violations.92 For example, the 
crime of practicing witchcraft will net a defendant two-to-three 
years in prison.93 Thus, this three-year sentence for a major 
                                                                                                     
 89.  Id. at 1; Republic v. Treza Senzani, Criminal Case Number 63 of 2014 
(High Court), Lilongwe District Registry (Unreported).  
 90.  See, e.g., Malawians Want Cashgator Treza Senzani to Rot in Jail, 
MARAVI POST (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.maravipost.com/2014/10/page/13/ (last 
visited July 9, 2016) (“A sample of Malawians, bitter with the looting of public 
funds in the historic Cashgate scandal . . . want to see the high court in 
Lilongwe deliver a harsh sentence to the first convict [Senzani].”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 91. See Wanga Gwede, Senzani Risks Vigilant Justice if Given Bail: 
Malawi Cashgate Prisoner, NYASA TIMES (Oct. 17, 2014), 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/senzani-risks-vigilant-justice-if-given-bail-malawi-
cashgate-prisoner/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (“[P]erhaps it is worthwhile taking 
a risk of being in prison for three years and thereafter enjoy millions of 
[kwacha].”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 92.  Senzani Sentence; A Mockery to Malawi’s Tax Payers, MAD CHIKUSAS 
(Oct. 10, 2014), https://themadchikusas.wordpress.com/2014/10/10/senzani-
sentence-a-mockery-to-malawis-tax-payers/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 93.  See, e.g., Man Slapped Two Years Jail Sentence For Practicing 
Witchcraft, FACE OF MALAWI (Mar. 16, 2016), 
http://www.faceofmalawi.com/2016/03/man-slapped-two-years-jail-sentence-for-
practicing-witchcraft/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (“Mangochi Second Grade 
Magistrate’s Court on Monday convicted and sentenced a 74-year old man to 
serve two years imprisonment with hard labor upon finding him guilty of 
presenting himself as a wizard, contrary to section 6 of the Witchcraft Act.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The Witchcraft Act is a relic of 
the British colonial era, with prosecutions falling under the purview of 
Magistrate Courts. The Act does not explicitly criminalize the practice of 
witchcraft, but implicitly does so by its prohibition on “pretending witchcraft” 
and outlawing the occupation of “witchfinder or witchdoctor.” Approximately 
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Cashgate defendant called into question whether the ACB and 
judiciary had truly given any serious consideration to community 
values.94  
The ACB thereafter demurred when other defendants sought 
to plead guilty to bargained charges.95 The DPP Director, 
however, recognizing “the public's desire to move more quickly on 
Cashgate cases,” spent half of the next year drafting internal 
guidelines for plea discussions in cases of serious or complex 
fraud.96 The completed guidelines mandated that a prosecutor 
must evaluate the impact of a proposed plea on the community, 
victim, and the prospects of successfully prosecuting accomplices. 
ACB prosecutors would charge defendants with the most serious 
crime(s). Defendants understood that if they cooperated early and 
voluntarily forfeited assets, judges would be inclined to impose a 
more lenient sentence.97 Although the guidelines were not 
                                                                                                     
ninety “witches” are imprisoned every year. See Chi Adanna Mgbako & 
Katherine Glenn, Witchcraft Accusations and Human Rights, 43 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L. L. REV. 389, 391, 396–97 (2011) (discussing witchcraft prosecutions Africa-
wide and Malawi-specific).  
 94.  Kayuni, supra note 87, at 2.  
 95.  See Golden Matonga, Cashgate Suspects Want Pre-Trial Bargains, 
NATION (Oct. 26, 2014), http://mwnation.com/cashgate-suspects-want-pre-trial-
bargains/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (“[The Minister of Justice] said government 
has no stance on whether to accept those courting prosecuting agencies with 
proposed deals.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Mphatso 
Nkhoma, Kalonga’s Cashgate Sentencing Deferred, NYASA TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016), 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/kalongas-cashgate-sentencing-deferred-serious-
allegations-made-against-prosecutors/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (“[Kalonga] was 
willing to plead guilty to the charges at early stage of the case but some officers 
in ACB and prosecution were stopping him from pleading guilty.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 96.  See Rebecca Chimjeka, UK Lawyers in for Cashgate, NATION (July 18, 
2015), http://mwnation.com/uk-lawyers-in-for-cashgate/ (last visited July 9, 
2016) (noting that the DFID advisor was “instrumental” in drafting the 
guidelines) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 97.  See Danwood Chirwa, Analysing Justice Kapindu’s Sentence on Malawi 
Chief Cashgater Lutepo, NYASA TIMES (Sep. 20, 2015), 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/analysing-justice-kapindus-sentence-on-malawi-
chief-cashgater-lutepo/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (“[I]f a person knows that he or 
she willingly committed Cashgate offences, it is better for [him or her] to plead 
guilty from the beginning, show real remorse, voluntarily make restitution, and 
assist the state in bringing to book others involved in the crimes. Only then will 
a court exercise leniency.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Paida Kadzakumunja, Savala Gets 7 Years for Money Laundering, THE NATION 
(June 27, 2016), http://mwnation.com/savala-gets-7-years-for-money-laundering/ 
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Supreme Court sanctioned, the ACB finally had a recognized 
framework within which to negotiate acceptable pleas.98 
Two high-profile pleas followed: Leonard Kalonga, the Chief 
Officer at the Ministry of Tourism, and Oswald Lutepo, a 
prominent businessman and senior official in President Banda's 
political party, each pleaded guilty to three counts of fraud and 
money laundering of MK 3.7 billion ($8 million) and MK 2.1 
billion ($5 million), respectively.99 Both men disclosed in their 
pleas that President Banda had masterminded the entire scheme 
and that they were conduits for funding her election campaign.100 
Kalonga admitted using $1.3 million to purchase six luxury sixty-
five--seater buses that were used to transport Banda’s political 
party supporters to and from campaign rallies.101 Lutepo had 
received the second highest amount of payments on the list of 
Cashgate contractors.102 
Kalonga’s sentencing date has been placed on indefinite hold, 
but it is expected that he will receive six-to-nine years in 
prison.103 Lutepo, perceived by the Court as “marginally 
remorseful,” was not granted leniency and sentenced to eleven 
years in prison.104 Thereafter, some minor Cashgate figures who 
                                                                                                     
(last visited July 9, 2016) (“She was not cooperative [and thus received a 
harsher sentence].”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 98.  Nonetheless, the validity of any bargained conviction will be an 
appellate issue for every defendant dissatisfied with his or her sentence. See, 
e.g., Malawi 'Cashgate' Scandal Official Jailed for 11 Years, supra note 68. 
 99.  See Wanga Gwede, Kalonga ‘Cashgate’ Sentencing Phase Begins, NYASA 
TIMES (Sep. 22, 2015), http://www.nyasatimes.com/kalonga-cashgate-sentencing-
phase-begins-judge-asks-for-mitigation-submission/ (last visited July 9, 2016) 
(“[Kalonga] had pleaded guilty . . . not to waste [the] court’s time.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Suzgo Khunga, When Plea Bargaining 
Failed Lutepo, NATION (Dec. 30, 2015), http://mwnation.com/when-plea-
bargaining-failed-lutepo/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (“Lutepo decided it was time 
to stop the charade and plead guilty to all charges, made less through a plea 
bargain that neither the defense nor the prosecution have admitted to since 
then.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 100.  Wanga Gwede, Kalonga’s JB Cashgate Link ‘Hearsay Evidence’, NYASA 
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.nyasatimes.com/kalongas-jb-cashgate-link-
hearsay-evidence-dpp-says-guilty-plea-milestone-in-pursuit-of-big-fishes/ (last 
visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 101.  Id.  
 102.  BAKER TILLY, supra note 11, at 31. 
 103.  Gwede, supra note 99. 
 104.  Khunga, supra note 99.  
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entered guilty pleas received three-to-five year sentences.105 With 
this series of pleas and sentences, community values were 
vindicated and the ACB and judiciary were redeemed.106 
C. Money Laundering  
 In 2006, Malawi passed an anti-money laundering 
law.107 The law made it a criminal offense punishable by up to ten 
years in prison to launder money, specifically to conceal or 
disguise the illicit origin of property, knowing or having reason to 
believe that the property was derived from the proceeds of 
crime.108 The law created a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and 
required financial institutions to report certain monetary and any 
suspicious transactions to the FIU. An intentional reporting 
violation by an officer of a financial institution was punishable by 
up to two years imprisonment, and for the institution a fine and 
loss of business authority.109  
Although at most only fifty Suspicious Transaction Reports 
(STRs) were sent annually to the FIU, no bank was ever 
investigated for failure to generate such reports.110 In fact, the 
anti-money laundering law was never used to prosecute anyone. 
By the time the Cashgate scandal broke, the ACB and the 
judiciary were faced with applying this complex law de novo, 
                                                                                                     
 105.  Id. 
 106.  See Chirwa, supra note 97 (noting “the public’s desire to move more 
quickly on cases”). 
 107.  Money Laundering, Proceeds of Serious Crime and Terrorist Financing 
Act, Cap. 8:07 (2006), Laws of Rep. of Malawi [hereinafter Money Laundering 
Act], http://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/africa/Malawi.aspx (last visited July 
9, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 108.  Id. § 35. 
 109.  Id. § 28. To ensure compliance, every financial institution is obligated 
to appoint a dedicated compliance officer. Id. § 32. 
 110.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2014 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL 
STRATEGY REPORT: MALAWI (2014), 
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/supplemental/227916.htm [hereinafter 
2014 MALAWI REPORT] (last visited June 30, 2016) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Rex Chikoko, Malawi Banks Left Scot-Free for Cashgate 
Roles, NATION (Mar. 21, 2015), http://mwnation.com/malawi-banks-left-scot-free-
for-cashgate-roles/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
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without precedent or guideline.111 This lack of experience 
partially explains why the first plea bargain with the Tourism 
Principal Secretary dissolved into a public relations disaster. The 
ACB and judiciary simply did not recognize the power of the 
money laundering law.112  
In his plea, Tourism Ministry Chief Officer Kalonga claimed 
that the Governor of the National Reserve Bank instructed 
managers at commercial banks to cash all government checks 
without question.113 Whether that was true or not, it would 
appear that the banks violated the relevant rules by turning a 
blind eye and not raising any concerns at the large sums 
deposited and withdrawn.114 On the rare occasions that banks did 
generate STRs, the manager of the FIU’s Monitoring and 
Analysis Section allegedly suppressed the reports. If anything, 
his arrest illuminated the high-degree, nuance, and 
sophistication entailed in covering up the conspiracy.115  
                                                                                                     
 111.  2014 MALAWI REPORT, supra note 110. As in other jurisdictions, in order 
to prove the offense of money laundering, there must be a predicate of the crime, 
namely that the property in question is criminal property. Initially it was 
thought that filing both the predicate crime and the money laundering crime 
would constitute double jeopardy. Jurisprudence then evolved to the concept of 
“merger,” namely distinguishing where the underlying crime ended and the 
money laundering began. Appeals on this issue are expected. See Kayuni, supra 
note 87, at 12 (discussing the elements of money laundering). 
 112.  See Kayuni, supra note 87, at 21 (“[T]here is no question that the 
prosecuting agencies and the judiciary made a huge stride in the cashgate 
scandal cases by having the Senzani Case as not only its first conviction but also 
a first every [sic] money laundering case in Malawi.”).  
 113.  Wanga Gwede, Reserve Bank Governor Chuka Risks Arrest in Malawi 
Cashgate Crackdown, NYASA TIMES (Aug. 28, 2015), 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/2015/08/28/reserve-bank-governor-chuka-risks-
arrest-in-malawi-cashgate-crackdown/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 114.  Three banks received 76% of all Cashgate funds; seven other banks 
split the remainder. See BAKER TILLY, supra note 11, at 23 (listing the 
institutions that received Cashgate funds). Aware of the reporting 
requirements, the conspirators preferred issuing checks to construction 
companies, which regularly dealt with larger amounts of money. Id. The 
companies owned by Oswald Lutepo and another contractor received 54% of the 
total value of Cashgate checks. Id. 
 115.  See ACB Arrest Financial Intelligence Unit Boss in Cashgate 
‘Breakthrough’, NYASA TIMES (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.nyasatimes.com/acb-
arrest-financial-intelligence-unit-boss-in-cashgate-breakthrough/ (last visited 
July 9, 2016) (“Investigators of the [ACB] told Nyasa Times that the arrest of 
[the FIU manager] is a “breakthrough” in the ongoing Cashgate prosecutions.”) 
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D. Asset Forfeiture 
Including the six buses purchased by Kalonga for the Banda 
campaign, an estimated MK 1 billion ($1.4 million) in cash and 
property has been recovered.116 That amount represents, at best, 
a mere three percent of the stolen Cashgate funds. The following 
description of tracing the proceeds of globalized organized crime 
networks in the 1990s aptly describes the Cashgate predicament:  
Money is the reason for the big crime syndicates' existence 
and, like Samson's hair, the source of their strength. Taking it 
away is the solution. Finding it is the problem. Many countries 
have by now passed seemingly stringent laws to trap criminal 
money as it flows through the laundry. With few exceptions, 
the United States and Australia most notably, the laws don't 
work. Even those that do are barely skimming the surface. 
Except for Italy—and this not until 1993—no country has 
managed so far to seize more than what these syndicates 
would consider petty cash.117  
Both the Corrupt Practices Act and the Money Laundering 
Act empower the ACB at any stage during the investigation or 
court proceedings to seize and freeze assets, no matter under 
whose name found, that are the proceeds of serious crime.118 At 
the inception of the Cashgate investigations, the ACB seized 
various properties, including houses, vehicles, office buildings, 
and other property belonging to suspects in the scandal.119 The 
Money Laundering Act mandates that the seizing authority must 
take “reasonable care to ensure that the property is preserved.”120 
The Act, furthermore, imposes liability upon the State for 
deterioration of seized property should the defendant be 
acquitted.121 Yet there is no government agency or mechanism to 
                                                                                                     
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 116.  Khamula, K1bn Cashgate Criminal Proceeds, supra note 29. 
 117.  CLAIRE STERLING, THIEVES WORLD: THE THREAT OF THE NEW GLOBAL 
NETWORK OF ORGANIZED CRIME 229 (1994). 
 118.  Corrupt Practices Act § 23A; Money Laundering Act §§ 48, 72. 
 119. MEJN REPORT, supra note 56, at 20. 
 120.  Money Laundering Act § 72. 
 121.  Id. § 47. Kayuni, supra note 87, at 20–21, discusses the case of Republic 
v. Greselder Jeffrey and others, wherein the DPP/ACB, upon charging the 
defendants in 2001 under the Anti-Corruption Act, seized the defendants’ 
houses and cars pending trial. Over the ten-year prosecution the cars and 
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manage the frozen bank accounts and seized properties and 
businesses.122 Thus, fearing liability, the ACB had no choice but 
to retract, proclaiming that “due to the unknown duration of the 
Cashgate trials, the Bureau feels it better not to seize property 
despite the Forfeiture Act giving it mandate.”123  
The six buses seized in connection with Kalonga’s arrest are 
an example of the pitfalls associated with not having an asset 
management framework in place. Had the buses been forfeited 
civilly in rem, lacking a proper claimant, they could have been 
promptly auctioned.124 Because they were seized criminally, per 
the Money Laundering Act’s mandate that official confiscation 
could only be effected after conviction,125 the buses remained 
parked, unused for two years, at a police lot.126  
As noted, the convicted Cashgate defendants were mid-level 
officials or businessmen who distributed funds to Banda party 
officials. Finding those funds is indeed the problem.127 Possibly, 
                                                                                                     
houses rapidly deteriorated. Id. The defendants were acquitted and are now 
suing the government for the value of their assets, approximately MK 900 
million ($1.5 million). Id.  
 122.  See THEODORE GREENBERG ET AL., WORLD BANK, STOLEN ASSET 
RECOVERY 85 (2009), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/Stolen_Asse
st_Recovery.pdf (noting that an effective asset forfeiture system requires 
organizational infrastructure to cope with the myriad practical issues that occur 
when handling seized and forfeited property). 
 123.  Paida Kadzakumanja, ACB Says Won’t Seize Cashgate Suspects’ 
Property, NATION (Dec. 2, 2014), http://mwnation.com/acb-says-wont-seize-
cashgate-suspects-property/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 124.  Money Laundering Act § 73. 
 125.  Id. § 48. 
 126.  Wanga Gwede, Cashgate Buses Given to Malawi Army, Police and 
Prison, NYASA TIMES (June 29, 2016), http://www.nyasatimes.com/cashgate-
buses-given-malawi-army-police-prison/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (“[T]hey were 
deteriorating in condition and depreciating in value.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Similarly, to avoid disposal issues, the DPP 
rejected Kalonga’s offer to turn over personal vehicles, rather than cash, as part 
of his plea bargain. See Mphatso Nkhoma, Court Defers Sentencing of Kalonga, 
NYASA TIMES (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.nyasatimes.com/2016/02/12/court-
defers-sentencing-of-kalonga-cashgate-convict-has-issues-to-sort-with-lawyer-
theu/ (last visited July 9, 2016) (discussing Kalonga’s plea bargain) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 127.  For two reports from 2011 that foretold methods by which Cashgate 
conspirators would hide proceeds, including externalizing cash through illegal 
foreign exchange traders, see FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT MALAWI, MONEY 
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the ACB could collaborate with civil society organizations in 
tracing questionable assets and filing in rem civil forfeiture 
actions.128 If proceeds are traced to neighboring countries, the 
ACB could pursue confiscation and repatriation remedies under 
the recovery provisions of various international anti-corruption 
conventions.129 Pursuing aggressive asset recovery techniques, 
however, requires adequate financial resources and sophisticated 
investigative capabilities.130 Ironically, it is the freeze in donor 
aid that today cripples the ACB’s capacity to achieve the 
extensive level of asset recovery demanded by the donors as a 
precondition to the resumption of aid.131 
IV. Final Observations 
It would seem that this time grand corruption in Africa has 
an enemy [ACB] worthy of the fight.132 
 
         – International Centre for Asset Recovery  
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Graft in Malawi is worsening.133 
 
                                             – Irish Aid Survey 
 
The accounts assistant whose maid’s revelations started the 
unraveling of the Cashgate scheme was convicted at trial and 
sentenced to nine years in prison, his vehicle and cash 
forfeited.134 Studies of corruption cases in presidential regimes in 
Africa have shown that while limited corruption can always 
escape presidential scrutiny, large-scale systematic corruption 
normally requires, at least, the President’s tacit acquiescence 
and, more likely, personal supervision.135 Given the improbability 
of a corrupt regime investigating itself, prosecutions usually only 
are possible when there is a regime change. But then, naturally, 
the question of political motivation arises.136  
Nonetheless, it is a government’s ability and resolve to deal 
decisively with the corrupt that evidences its political will to 
tackle corruption.137 Since the Malawian public already views 
Cashgate as a national disaster, the government could begin 
restoring confidence by declaring likewise.138 But President 
Mutharika rejects the notion that corruption is endemic in 
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Malawi, professing that Cashgate only arose due to 
“irresponsibility” and “laxity” in managing public monies.139  
Even though several conspirators have detailed former 
President Banda’s involvement, she has not been charged in the 
Cashgate scandal.140 There has been little progress in the pending 
theft and money laundering trials of her senior officials.141 
Instead, the DPP and ACB invested their limited resources in 
prosecuting Kasambara for Mphwiyo’s attempted assassination, a 
trial that critics came to view as a two-year diversion from the 
desired anti-corruption focus.142 Still, the fifteen convictions to 
date and the ACB’s increasing use of plea bargaining, money 
laundering laws, and, to some degree, asset forfeiture provide 
cause for guarded optimism. Interestingly, the Cashgate cases 
follow the same pattern seen in the thousands of other cases filed 
in the Malawian criminal justice system: namely, a high 
proportion of those arrested are not prosecuted, but of those who 
are prosecuted, the conviction rate is high.143  
Regardless, perceptions of corruption continue to increase.144 
With the ACB’s capacity drained by the human and financial 
resources needed to fully investigate and prosecute Cashgate, 
allegations of new corrupt schemes soon recede from the 
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headlines.145 Although donor-driven reforms over the past decade 
have had some positive, short-term results, the reforms never 
resulted in long-term changes in the behavior of government 
officials.146 Given the low probability of punitive action, corrupt 
officials never ceased their illegal practices.147 By the end of 
President Bingu wa Mutharika’s administration, it appeared that 
his commitment to good democratic and economic governance had 
waned.148 The Cashgate scandal revealed the same lack of 
commitment by Joyce Banda’s administration.149 And today, 
unless the ACB is provided with sufficient independence, 
authority, and resources to function efficiently, the avowed zero-
tolerance of Peter Mutharika’s administration will be 
problematical.150  
                                                                                                     
 145.  Chiumia, supra note 19.  
 146.  See MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, MALAWI THRESHOLD 
PROGRAM END TERM EVALUATION 43 (2010), 
https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/content-121510-
malawi_threshold_program_evaluation.pdf (“[T]here is no evidence that 
Threshold activities had any impact on the overall goal of combating public 
sector corruption.”). 
 147.  OXFAM AMERICA, TO FIGHT CORRUPTION, LOCALIZE AID 14 (2015), 
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/1502034_AidCorruption_3web.p
df. 
 148.  Id. at 17. 
 149.  The rationale is explained in George Ayittey, Why Africa is Poor, in 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PROMOTING PROGRESS OR PERPETUATING 
POVERTY? 57, 62 (J. Morris, ed., 2002), 
http://ieas.unideb.hu/admin/file_6845.pdf:  
Since politics constitutes the gateway to fabulous wealth in Africa, 
the competition for political power has always been ferocious. 
Political defeat could mean exile, jail or starvation. Those who win 
power take over key state institutions and proceed to plunder the 
treasury. Key positions in these institutions are handed over to the 
president's tribesmen, cronies and loyal supporters—to serve their 
interests and not those of the people or the nation. Meritocracy, rule 
of law, property rights, transparency and administrative capacity 
vanish. 
 150.  Chiumia, supra note 19; see, e.g., ACB Corruption Inaction on Malawi 
Army Deal Involving Ministers and Ashok Leyland of India, NYASA TIMES (June 
20, 2016), http://www.nyasatimes.com/acb-corruption-inaction-malawi-army-
deal-involving-ministers-ashok-leyland-india/ (last visited July 9, 2016) 
(“[S]ources within the [ACB] informed Nyasa Times of increased meddling by 
the Executive to suffocate the investigations.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
336 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 303 (2016) 
There has been progress in the Cashgate cases, and the 
endeavors of the DPP Director and the ACB should be 
recognized.151 But given the aforementioned administrative and 
financial constraints, let alone the death threats and Njauju’s 
murder, the quest to secure convictions in the more complex cases 
may become quixotic. The ACB may be “worthy of the fight,” but 
the expectations imposed by the donors and public are 
unrealistic.152 Given the donors’ freeze of budgetary support, the 
lack of financial resources will be a continual problem hobbling 
the ACB’s effectiveness.153 Further, the historical lack of 
communication between investigators and prosecutors arguably 
may well handicap the prosecutors at trial.  
But even if the senior-level officials are convicted, without 
the recovery of significant assets to make a meaningful dent in 
the $45 million Cashgate loss, all prognostications indicate that it 
is unlikely that Western donors will resume direct budgetary aid 
to Malawi.154 And wherever Western countries retract in Africa, 
China seizes the opportunity to extend its influence.155 All the 
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while, Malawi may well continue its slide down the abyss, its 





                                                                                                     
(last visited July 9, 2016) (discussing “[Chinese] loans that raise the spectre of 
debt for the country to $300 million.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 156.  See Malawi Sitting on Time Bomb – Analysts, NYASA TIMES (Jan. 23, 
2016), http://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-sitting-on-time-bomb-analysts/ (last 
visited July 9, 2016) (“The country's economic woes are unlikely to disappear 
soon since the backbone of the economy [is] under serious attack . . . . [T]he 
Kwacha continues to slump sharply against the major trading currencies, a 
situation worsened by the absence of donors’ inflows that greatly act as a buffer 
to the Kwacha.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
